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Abstract:  
 
This article critically assesses the compliance model of employment standards (ES) enforcement 
through a study of monetary employment standards violations in Ontario, Canada. The findings 
suggest that, in contexts where changes to the organization of work deepen insecurity for 
employees, models of enforcement that emphasize compliance over deterrence are unlikely to 
effectively prevent or remedy ES violations.   
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Introduction  
 
Inadequate employment standards (ES) enforcement is a widely acknowledged policy problem 
across jurisdictions. There is growing recognition that the changing nature of employment fuels 
precariousness in labour markets, and creates an environment in which employees face greater 
risk of experiencing ES violations. At the lower end of the labor market, in industries such as 
cleaning, food services, and accommodation, the increasing prevalence of sub-contracting and 
outsourcing further intensifies competition and makes ES violations a routine strategy of labor 
cost containment (Weil 2010, 2014; Milkman, González and Ikeler 2012; Bernhardt, Spiller and 
Polson 2013). The limited resources available to labor inspectorates (ILO 2006, para. 370) and 
the dominance of a reactive, complaints-based enforcement system (Weil and Pyles 2006) means 
that only a small fraction of ES violations are redressed in many jurisdictions.    
 Some jurisdictions have attempted to buttress workplace protections through the adoption 
of reforms to their ES enforcement systems (Davidov 2010; Weil 2014; Amengual and Fine 
2016). Many of these reforms reflect a ‘compliance’ model of enforcement, which entails 
assumptions about the nature of violations and how regulation should be implemented. The 
compliance model presumes violations to be largely exceptional rather than normal behavior and 
due primarily to a lack of knowledge among regulated parties (Gunningham 2010). It casts 
regulated parties as interested in legal compliance, and therefore privileges soft-touch modes of 
regulation. The compliance model’s conception of violations and the behavior of regulated 
parties diverges sharply from a deterrence model of regulation, which views non-compliance 
with the law as often intentional behavior driven by a cost-benefit calculus and warranting 
punishment (Pearce and Tombs 1990).   
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This article challenges  the theoretical assumptions of the compliance model in the 
context of ES enforcement  through a case study of monetary ES violations
1– or what is known 
colloquially as “wage theft” – in Ontario, Canada. As in other jurisdictions, the Government of 
Ontario’s recent efforts to improve ES enforcement draw heavily from the compliance paradigm. 
Among other changes, starting in the mid-2000s the Ontario Ministry of Labour (MOL) 
produced more promotional material for employers and employees on their respective rights and 
responsibilities under the Employment Standards Act (ESA) and made greater use of self-help 
and settlements to expedite the resolution of ES problems. Yet an analysis of a previously 
unavailable source of administrative data on ES enforcement in the province demonstrates how 
the compliance framework alone is a deficient model on which to base reforms to workplace 
regulation. Indeed, the empirical findings offered herein reveal a disjuncture between central 
premises of the compliance model and employees’ experience of monetary ES violations. 
Contrary to the compliance model’s emphasis on empowered and cooperative self-regulation, ES 
complaint data suggest that imbalances in workplace power constrain the exercise of employee 
voice and make seeking legal redress a risky venture for employees. The characteristics of the ES 
complaints that are investigated and validated by the MOL also suggest that monetary violations 
of ES are frequently not the result of ignorance or incompetence on the part of employers. 
Rather, the relatively large median dollar value associated with monetary violations, and the low 
rates of recovery of MOL-issued monetary orders, point toward the intentionality of violations 
and employer recalcitrance in the enforcement process. Findings from this Ontario-based case 
study thereby suggest that, in contexts where changes to the organization of work deepen 
insecurity for employees and augment employer power, models of enforcement that emphasize 
compliance over deterrence are unlikely to effectively prevent or remedy ES violations and can 
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exacerbate regulatory degradation (Tombs and Whyte 2013). Effective workplace regulation that 
helps pre-empt ES violations requires enforcement models that start from a dual recognition of 
workplace power imbalances and the likelihood that many violations are intentional. 
The remainder of this article proceeds in three parts. Section one defines the features of a 
compliance model of enforcement and the related notion of the enforcement pyramid, contrasting 
more deterrence oriented approaches. Turning to the empirical analysis, section two describes the 
dominance of a compliance orientation in the enforcement of the Ontario ESA with attention to 
the case of monetary ES violations. Against this backdrop, it provides a profile of the reporting 
behaviour of complainants and features of complaints that run counter to the image of mutual 
interest and cooperation between employers and employees and the unintentionality of 
violations. By way of conclusion, section three asserts that a model of ES monetary violations 
that assumes they are frequently intentional activity is a necessary starting point for improved 
enforcement.  
Before proceeding, a note on methods and sources is warranted. As the chief 
administrative data set retained under the provincial ESA, and the principal data source for this 
paper, the MOL’s Employment Standards Information System (ESIS) contains information on all 
complaints submitted and their outcomes, violations detected, inspections conducted, 
settlements, the use of enforcement mechanisms, wage recovery, and Ontario Labour Relations 
Board Reviews (commonly known as Appeals). A central feature of the ESIS is that it provides a 
nearly-complete census of Ontario's ES enforcement activities and their outcomes that is not 
otherwise publically available. But while it captures a variety of information related to the ESA 
and its enforcement, the ESIS is primarily a tracking and record-keeping system. Like other 
administrative data, it has several limitations: first and foremost, as an indicator of reactive 
5 
 
enforcement practices, it only captures the experiences of those who are successful in entering 
the administrative system. The vast majority of employees who experience a violation do not 
complain; hence, they are not captured in administrative data (Weil and Pyles 2006; Noack, 
Vosko and Grundy 2015). Second, as it was not designed for research purposes, ESIS data have 
not undergone the same quality control and data verification processes as survey data from large 
statistical agencies. Thus, the dataset includes inconsistencies, some of which appear to result 
from discrepancies in complainants' reporting (such as complainants who indicate that they are 
"still working" for an "out of business" employer), and some of which appear to occur when one 
aspect of the database is updated, but additional information remains in the system (such as when 
a complaint is listed as being "denied" but also has an Order to Pay Wages issued for it).
2
 In 
many instances, it is not possible to verify which information is correct; for this reason, in the 
ensuing analysis, the general approach is to let these inconsistencies persist.  
I.  The Dominance of Compliance in Employment Standards Enforcement 
 
For as long as there has been wage labor, there have been unpaid wage claims. The reason lies in 
the near universal practice of paying employees in arrears – after they have provided service.  
This makes wage workers (i.e., employees) their employers’ creditors in between pay days, and 
like all creditors they run the risk of not being paid.  However, wage employees are not like 
ordinary creditors in many ways. Unlike commercial creditors, they do not have the ability to run 
credit checks or to diversify credit risks among a number of different employers. But, more 
fundamentally, they stand in a relationship of asymmetrical dependency with their employers 
(Wright 2015).   
Historically, most wage protection laws aimed to facilitate wage recovery and thus 
created legal mechanisms to enhance wage workers' ability to recover what they were owed.  
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These are compliance measures in the sense that they aim to ensure that employers fulfil their 
contractual obligations. There has been much less appetite to deploy deterrence measures that 
punish employers for their failure to pay wages in the first place by making non-payment a 
regulatory offense or a crime.
3
 Yet questions relating to the use of compliance and deterrence 
measures have been and remain  a matter of public concern. For instance, in Canada, from 1935 
to 1954, it was a crime to intentionally not pay the minimum wage established by a law of 
Canada (S.C. 1935, c. 56; Tucker 2016). Most recently, these issues have been foregrounded by 
campaigns that target “wage theft” by employers (e.g., Judson and Francisco-McGuire 2012).     
There is also a longstanding debate in the legal literature about the use of compliance and 
deterrence approaches to regulatory enforcement (Reiss 1984; Gunningham 2010: Reynaers and 
Parrado 2016). Compliance and deterrence theories are based on fundamentally different 
assumptions about the causes of legal violations and their normative significance. Applied to 
questions of workplace regulation, deterrence theory is premised on the idea that a substantial 
proportion of labor standards violations, including non-payment of wages, are caused by the 
intentional actions of employers who have determined they are better off not complying with 
their legal obligations. Therefore, the goal of the law should be to alter employers’ behavior by 
raising the risk of being caught and/or increasing the penalties for breaching the law. An 
emphasis on this goal will generate specific and general deterrence thereby shaping the future 
behavior of both the employer found to be in violation and of employers generally (Pearce and 
Tombs 1990; Tombs and Whyte 2013a). Moreover, deterrence theorists make the normative 
claim that wage violations should not be treated as a private problem resolved by compensating 
the individual for her or his loss, but rather should be viewed as a serious social hazard that not 
only harms individual employees and their dependents but that also contributes to a climate in 
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which processes of evasion, erosion and abandonment could lead to a gloves-off labor market in 
which public decency is sacrificed to the drive to maximize profits at any cost (Almond and 
Colover 2012).   
In contrast, compliance theory is premised on the idea that violations, including 
presumably breaches of the duty to pay, are the result of employer ignorance and incompetence 
rather than intentional behavior. The primary strategy for improving employers’ performance of 
their legal obligations, therefore, is to provide information and compliance assistance on the 
assumption that most employers will respond by becoming law abiding citizens. Indeed, in 
particularly optimistic versions of compliance theory, employers will go beyond the minimum 
that is required and a culture of compliance will foster even higher standards of behavior. The 
few bad apples that do not respond to compliance measures will then be isolated and subject to 
deterrence measures. This approach is seen to be particularly appropriate in the employment 
context, where regulations apply to individuals and corporations engaged in beneficial economic 
activities.  As a result, non-payment of wages is principally framed as an instrumental problem 
rather than a moral one for which punishment is merited (Almond and Colover 2012). Figure 1 
below provides a somewhat simplified but nevertheless accurate account of key differences 
between deterrence and compliance approaches to enforcement. 
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Figure 1: Features of Deterrence and Compliance Regulatory Paradigms 
 
 
Ayres and Braithwaite's (1992) responsive regulation approach aimed to transcend the debate 
between those who favor stronger state regulation (deterrence) and those who favor more self-
regulation (compliance). Their key idea is that rather than needing to choose between compliance 
and deterrence, both elements can be combined effectively in a way that is responsive to the 
regulatory context. The model developed by these authors, and for which responsive regulation 
is best known, is the enforcement pyramid which starts with persuasion at the base and provides 
that if and only if this fails to secure compliance, regulators should escalate to the next 
enforcement action that has more bite and if, and only if, this action fails escalate again, 
eventually reaching the most serious sanctions with the greatest deterrence effects. The 
assumption of the pyramid is that most regulatory activity will take place at the bottom and that 
fewer and fewer regulatory interventions will be necessary as regulatory interventions become 
more forceful. The hammer of deterrence is necessary, but should largely remain hidden. 
9 
 
The enforcement pyramid and its preference for and heavy reliance on compliance 
measures assume that violations are exceptional, the result of ignorance or incompetence, and 
that most employers are predisposed to obey the law. While Ayres and Braithwaite insist that the 
enforcement pyramid is designed to address both those who are inclined to virtue and those who 
are not, they embrace the republican idea that “most citizens comply with the law most of the 
time because it seems wrong to them to break the law” (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, 94). The 
model is rooted in Third Way political discourse which imagines that antagonistic social 
relations can be transcended by civic republicanism’s emphasis on the empowering potential of 
dialogue and participation (Mascini 2012; Tombs and Whyte 2013). The model of the 
enforcement pyramid further entails transposition from citizen to corporation, which underlies 
the “moralization of the corporation” (Shamir 2010), without making any reference to the 
political economic context in which it operates. 
The omission of political economic context is critical, especially when neo-liberal modes 
of governance weaken state capacity to regulate against the interests of profit-maximizing 
corporations, and undermine the ability of workers to act collectively to defend their interests 
within the corporation (Harvey 2005; Tombs and Whyte 2010).  The impact of such 
transformations  on the changing nature of employment provides grounds to question some of the 
tenets of the compliance model for ES enforcement (Davidov 2010; Tucker 2013; Dickens 2014; 
Vosko, Grundy and Thomas 2016). Weil (2014) demonstrates that in many sectors of the U.S. 
economy, employment relations have been transformed through a process of fissuring which 
leads businesses to avoid having employees through contracting out, franchising and the use of 
extended supply chains. The result is that employment is being pushed into increasingly 
competitive environments where employers are under enormous pressure to reduce costs, and 
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since labor costs often comprise a considerable portion of total costs in these industries the 
incentive to violate the law grows, resulting in a greater propensity to engage in intentionally 
evasive actions.
4
 Other researchers document the spread of precarious employment in Ontario, 
which parallels the conditions described by Weil in the United States, highlighting asymmetrical 
power relations resulting from the loss of security that employees experience (Lewchuk et al. 
2015). Such asymmetries have substantial implications for employees’ willingness/ability to act 
as their own advocates, let alone on behalf of the interests of their co-workers, particularly in the 
context of non-unionized workplaces (Gray 2009; Almond and Gray, Accepted Article). Even 
though ES legislation typically protects employees against reprisals for seeking to enforce their 
rights, under precarious employment conditions fear of retaliation is likely to grow and thus 
undermines the culture needed to support a reliance on compliance measures as the principal 
means of ES enforcement.  
The analysis below critically interrogates the assumptions of the compliance model 
through a case study of ES enforcement in Ontario drawing on the MOL’s administrative data. 
While administrative data on ES complaints do not provide a direct measure of ES violations on 
the ground, as complaints represent only a small fraction of overall violations,
 
the data can 
provide insight into certain characteristics of complainants and the claims they make, and the 
behavior of employers once they enter into the enforcement process. Through an analysis of data 
from complaints submitted in the 2014/15 fiscal year
5
 (unless otherwise indicated below), this 
inquiry demonstrates the fallacy of several premises of a compliance framework. The analysis 
focuses primarily on complainants who received entitlements for claims related to unpaid wages, 
overtime pay, vacation pay/time, public holidays or public holiday pay, deductions from wages, 
minimum wage, termination pay and severance pay.  When focusing on settlements, 
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complainants who submitted claims for unpaid wages, overtime pay, vacation pay/time, public 
holidays or public holiday pay, deductions from wages, minimum wage, termination pay and 
severance pay are examined. Results reveal how the situation of aggrieved employees, and the 
common features of monetary ES violations, are at odds with narratives of empowered self-
advocacy among employees and the unintentionality of workplace violations.  
II. Compliance in the Enforcement of Ontario’s Employment Standards Act, 2000 
 
For the majority of employees in Ontario, the ESA establishes minimum standards in areas including 
wages, hours of work, overtime pay, vacations, public holidays, and termination and severance. In 
principle, the legislation was designed to provide regulatory protection for employees with little 
bargaining power and particularly for those not represented by a union. The enforcement of the ESA 
has long been oriented around a compliance-based approach to workplace regulation. The bulk 
of enforcement resources go into the operation of an administrative process for wage recovery.
6
 
Employees can complain to the MOL that their rights under the Act have been violated (s. 96). If 
the complainant has taken the steps specified as a condition of filing a complaint (s. 96.1), the 
Director may assign the complaint to an Employment Standards Officer (ESO) who has the 
power to conduct an investigation (ss. 86, 91). If the ESO finds a violation, the officer has 
multiple powers. In terms of wage recovery, the ESO can facilitate a settlement (s. 112), solicit a 
voluntary payment from the employer, or issue an order to pay the amount owing (s. 103), which 
must also include an order to pay administrative costs. There are additional powers to recover the 
wages if they are not paid by the employer, including issuing orders to pay to corporate directors 
(s. 106) or related employers (s. 4). These are all compliance measures in that they are limited to 
enforcing the statutory obligation to pay wages without imposing any penalty for having failed to 
do so. 
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The ESA also provides for deterrence measures. An employer that contravenes the Act, 
including non-payment of wages, commits a regulatory offense (s. 132) and becomes liable on 
conviction to a fine or imprisonment. It is also a regulatory offense to fail to comply with an 
order to pay wages, but it is important remember that non-payment is itself an offense.  The 
procedures for prosecuting regulatory offenses are outlined under the Provincial Offences Act 
(S.O. 1990, c. P.33), which provides for tickets (R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 950) or formal prosecutions. 
There is also a lesser deterrence measure available under the ESA, a Notice of Contravention (s. 
113), but it is not available for wage violations (O.Reg. 289/01). 
Reforms to the enforcement process in the 2010s that emphasized conciliatory regulation 
and self-help/self-representation further tilted Ontario’s ES enforcement regime toward the 
compliance model. For example, changes to the ESA in 2010 introduced a requirement for 
complainants to attempt to resolve their concern directly with their employer prior to an 
intervention by the MOL. Subsequent to this change, part of the MOL’s determination about 
whether a complaint would be investigated include whether or not an employee sufficiently 
attempts to first approach their employer with their concerns. Operating during the period of this 
study, the adoption of this initial step entrenched the MOL’s emphasis on ‘self-reliance’ as the 
primary mechanism through which ES complaints are to be resolved.  
Simultaneous reforms to the ESA introduced an additional avenue for employees and 
employers to resolve claims through facilitated settlements. Previously only non-facilitated 
settlements could be reached between employees and employers. Non-facilitated settlements 
require that a written agreement be provided to the ESO outlining the terms of the settlement, 
and the claim is then closed without an admission of wrongdoing and without requiring the ESO 
to assess whether an ES violation has occurred. Facilitated settlements involve the ESO as a 
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settlement facilitator between the employee and the employer. According to the MOL’s 
guidelines, the ESO is involved in “[h]elping parties understand the strengths and weaknesses of 
their cases; providing parties with information on how the ESA applies to their cases; [and] 
helping parties to frame their position and communicate with each other” (MOL undated: 3). The 
introduction of a new form of settlement and the requirement for attempted self-resolution at the 
outset of the claim process reinforce the MOL’s tendency to approach ES regulation in a manner 
that assumes employer and employee responsibility for ES compliance. The emphasis now 
placed on settlements reflects key assumptions of the compliance framework: that regulated 
parties have the capacity to represent their interests effectively, and that most employers, if 
provided the correct information, will comply with the legislation (Thomas 2009).  
a. Complainants’ Reporting Behavior: Indications of Workplace Power-Imbalances 
and the Risk of Exercising Voice    
 
ESIS data on the characteristics of complainants paint a picture that runs counter to the 
compliance model’s assumption of empowered self-representation and conciliatory and non-
antagonistic regulation. They indicate that power imbalances in the workplace impede the 
exercise of employee voice. Only a small minority of complaints with wage related violations, 
consistently less than 1 in 10 each year, are filed by individuals who are on the job they are 
complaining about. Such low rates of complaints from individuals in the job they are 
complaining about appear to be longstanding, as the 2004 Annual Report of the Auditor General 
of Ontario found a similar rate of on-the-job complaints (10%). These low rates suggest that 
complainants likely perceive filing a complaint as a risky venture.  
As intended by the self-resolution requirement introduced into the ESA in 2010, the vast 
majority (85%) of those who made complaints with a monetary component in the 2014/15 year 
reported that they contacted or tried to contact their employer with their concerns. Among those 
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who entered into the formal complaints process, about one-third of those who contacted their 
employers (32%) report that their employer refused to do anything, and 18% report that their 
employer did not respond to their concerns. Among those who did not contact or attempt to 
contact their employers about their concerns, the most frequently cited reason for non-contact 
was fear. This concern was raised by almost half (41%) of those who did not attempt to get in 
touch with their employer. It is likely that for many employees who experience monetary 
violations of ES, fear is a major impediment to contacting their employer and/or entering into the 
formal ES complaints system.  
The central risk employees face if they speak out about workplace conditions is reprisal 
from employers, which can entail receiving undesirable assignments and schedules, being 
subject to harassment from management or co-workers, or being terminated, among other things. 
Fear of reprisal is a longstanding factor in discouraging employees from initiating ES complaints 
against their current employer with the MOL (Fudge 1991; Employment Standards Working 
Group 1996). The risks of reprisal after complaining about a violation are shaped by the social 
location of claimants. For example, employees participating in Canada’s Temporary Foreign 
Worker Program are tied to a single employer, and can face non-renewal of their employment or 
potentially deportation if they seek to access the ES complaints system (Faraday 2014). ESIS 
data indicate that reprisal claims filed by complainants are increasing. Whereas in 2008/09, 
reprisal claims were only included in 4% of all complaints with wage-theft violations, the 
proportion of complaints that have a reprisal component have grown steadily across time, 
increasing to 6% in 2010/11 and 9% in 2014/15. The increase in the proportion of complaints with 
reprisal claims provides additional evidence to suggest that self-help requirement exacerbates the 
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risks of filing an ES complaint. Reprisal claims are also more common among complainants still 
working for their employer at the time that they make a complaint.   
The MOL’s own data on complainants’ reporting activity thus demonstrate that claims-
making activities are inevitably related to power imbalances in the workplace, which are well-
documented in studies on ES enforcement (Ruckelshaus 2008; Alexander 2013; Tucker 2013; 
Griffith 2015). There are strong grounds to suggest that the self-help requirement discourages 
some aggrieved employees from filing a complaint. This conclusion is supported by the recent, 
notable decrease in the share of non-unionized employees in Ontario who file ES complaints. 
Before the introduction of the self-help requirement, the number of ES complaints received by 
the MOL increased, and then steadily declined after the requirement’s introduction (see Figure 
2). Whereas the decline levelled off starting in 2012/13, the overall downward trend after 2010 is 
notable given the increase in the absolute number of non-unionized employees in Ontario during 
this period. At its peak in 2008/09, the MOL received roughly one complaint per every 175 non-
unionized employees in the province, whereas in 2014/15, it received roughly one complaint per 
every 285 non-unionized employees.  
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Figure 2: Employment Standards Complaints Received
7
 
 
ESIS data on the industrial location of complainants further counters the compliance 
framework’s account of the unintentionality of violation. The data point to the relevance of 
economic considerations in employers’ violations of ES.  Employees who make monetary 
complaints are concentrated in specific industrial sectors (see Figure 3). In 2014/15, the sectors 
of accommodation and food services, construction, and management, administration and other 
support services generated monetary ES complaints at a rate disproportionate to their size. The 
high absolute and relative number of complaints from employees in the accommodation and food 
services industry is particularly notable. The majority of complainants from this industry (54%) 
are employed in full-service restaurants, and a quarter (25%) are found in limited service eating 
places, such as fast food restaurants. The next most overrepresented industry among monetary 
ES complaints is construction. The largest number of complaints from the construction industry 
come from residential building construction and all other speciality trade contractors. The third 
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most overrepresented industry grouping is referred to as management, administrative and other 
support services. This category includes call centres, temporary staffing agencies, building and 
grounds services, cleaning services, security services, waste disposal services, among others. The 
largest number of complainants from the support services industry comes from janitorial 
services, landscaping services, security guards and patrol services, and telephone call centers.  
Figure 3: Industry of Validated Monetary Employment Standards Complaints
8
 (2014/15) 
 
 
It is impossible to decipher the prevalence of violations at the industry level with administrative 
data. Industries characterized by high rates of violations may generate relatively low levels of 
complaints, and vice versa (Weil and Pyles 2006). The decision to file (or not file) a complaint is 
related in part to the culture of an industry which shapes what violations become normalized and 
routinely disregarded by workers, and those which are considered inappropriate and requiring 
redress. However, the concentration of monetary ES complainants in accommodation and food 
services, support services and the construction industry is consistent with findings in other 
jurisdictions. In the United States, these industries have been identified as priorities for the 
Federal Department of Labor’s Strategic Enforcement initiatives which aim to direct resources to 
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industries where violations are most likely to occur (Weil 2010, 10). Whereas in the 
manufacturing industry, a dominant strategy of labor cost reduction is the relocation of 
production to jurisdictions with less stringent regulations, employers in non-mobile service 
industries pursue lower labor costs through what Weil (2010) calls fissuring, which entails the 
use of sub-contracting and outsourcing. A long-time practice in the construction industry, and 
now a central feature of business support services and the accommodation industry, the 
offloading of labor costs onto smaller entities and labor intermediaries generates intensive 
pressures and opportunities for employers to violate ES (Estlund, 2005; Weil, 2010; Bernhardt, 
Spiller and Polson 2013; Fine, 2013). The industrial location of many complainants in highly 
fissured industries suggests that ES violations are being driven by broader economic factors 
including industrial restructuring and precarious employment rather than simply ignorance or 
incompetence on the part of employers.  
Complainants also overwhelmingly tend to have worked in smaller companies (see 
Figure 4).
9 
Employees in small firms of fewer than 20 employees are grossly over represented 
among complainants. Whereas only 23% of employees in Ontario work for firms of this size, 
they account for a majority of monetary ES complaints at 62%. Almost forty percent (39%) of 
complaints come from those working in firms that employ 6-19 people – typically small or start-
up companies that go beyond an individual entrepreneur. It could be that small firms lack the HR 
capacities to ensure full compliance, thus supporting the compliance narrative. But, given 
previous research that demonstrates how precarious employment is more prevalent in small 
workplaces (Noack and Vosko 2011), due to their vulnerability to instabilities associated with 
economic fluctuations,
10
 it is more plausible that small firms are more likely to transgress 
workplace standards as a labor cost reduction strategy. Complaints related to small firms are 
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more likely to include claims for unpaid wages, reflecting the financial constraints of small firms 
and their greater likelihood of having employees in arrears.  
Figure 4: Firm Size of Validated Monetary Employment Standards Complaints (2014/15) 
 
 
In sum, the model of violations inherent in the compliance framework does not reflect important 
aspects of complainants’ experience of ES violations in Ontario. Contrary to assumptions of 
effective self-representation and the viability of conciliatory modes of claims resolution in the 
compliance model, ESIS data point to the existence of workplace power imbalances that 
discourage claims making, and limit effective self-regulation on the part of employees. The data 
indicate employees’ overwhelming tendency to avoid filing complaints while still on the job, as 
well as their perception or experience of the risks of reprisal associated with filing a complaint. 
Claims data further demonstrate the concentration of complainants in industries and firms 
characterized by high rates of precarious employment. These characteristics of ES complaints 
belie the assumption that many violations are unintentional, an assumption that is central to the 
compliance-based model’s prescriptions for education and awareness initiatives.  
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b. The Prevalence of Egregious and Unresolved Monetary Complaints11  
 
While administrative data do not allow for determining the most common types of violations that 
occur on the ground, they do permit a number of observations regarding complaints that cast 
further doubt on the compliance model’s narrative of violations as largely unintentional and 
amenable to voluntarist solutions. The most common type of monetary claim submitted to the 
MOL is for unpaid wages, either alone or in combination with other claims (see Figure 5).
12
 
Unpaid wage claims are included in 60% of monetary wage-theft complaints. A similar trend 
appears among validated complaints, over half (52%) of which include a claim for unpaid wages. 
The prevalence of claims for unpaid wages is noteworthy because, among the various standards 
that can be claimed, unpaid wages are unlikely to be simply attributable to incompetence or a 
lack of information on the part of the employer. The likelihood that unpaid wages are the result 
of an employer's intentional practice is underscored by their size. The median dollar value of 
validated claims for unpaid wages is $793. These unpaid wage entitlements represent a 
substantial portion of weekly or monthly earnings for low wage earners, and suggest that 
monetary violations are typically more egregious than is acknowledged in a compliance 
framework that stresses the unintentionality of violation. 
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Figure 5: Prevalence of Employment Standards Claims among Validated Monetary 
Complaints (2014/15) 
 
A comparison of the median dollar value of complaints resolved via voluntary compliance versus 
those for which compliance is ordered is also telling. In half of complaints with a monetary 
entitlement (50%), the employer voluntary complies with the ESO’s finding and pays the 
entitlement, an outcome consistent with the non-antagonistic modes of redress emphasized under 
the compliance model. Complaints that are closed through voluntary compliance tend to be for 
lower total claim values than those with a monetary order. Among complaints closed through 
voluntary compliance, the median total entitlement is $603. In contrast, among complaints where 
compliance is ordered, the median total entitlement is $1,860. Clearly, employers are most likely 
to voluntarily comply with lower-value entitlements, a fact which further indicates the role of 
business considerations in shaping employers’ decisions to cooperate in the enforcement process.   
If voluntary compliance is not achieved, the ESO will normally issue a monetary order in 
the form of an Order to Pay Wages or an Order to Compensate and/or Reinstate. Recovery rates 
for monetary orders are disturbingly low. When all complaints with a monetary order during the 
period between 2009/10 and 2014/15 are considered, only 39% were fully satisfied, 7% were 
partially satisfied, and 54% were not satisfied. Outstanding orders are sent to collections, and of 
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those, only one in five (22%) are subsequently fully satisfied. In the case of monetary orders, 
partial or non-cooperation on the part of employers is the norm rather than the exception. It is 
important to note here that businesses that are bankrupt or in receivership are not issued an Order 
to Pay Wages or an Order to Compensate and/or Reinstate. Recovery rates among these types of 
businesses are much lower than the rates presented above. The MOL’s limited success in 
recovering money for complainants further belies the assumption of cooperation in the 
compliance framework.  
Another possible outcome for complaints is a settlement. Employers and employees can 
arrive at a settlement, with or without the ESO acting as a settlement facilitator. Not surprisingly, 
the larger the submitted total claim amount, the less likely that it will be settled for 100% or 
more of that amount. Facilitated settlements, which are generally used for higher-value claims, 
lead to inferior outcomes for workers than non-facilitated settlements (see Figure 6). In 34% of 
cases, facilitated settlements are settled for less than half of an employee's total initial claim, while 
almost 25% of non-facilitated settlements are settled for less than half of an employee's total initial 
claim, suggesting that the involvement of the ESO produces a resolution that is overall less favorable 
to the complainant. These results lend credence to concerns voiced by analysts when compliance-
oriented reforms were introduced – that the adoption of facilitated settlements would introduce 
new pressures for complainants to accept settlements below their legal entitlements.  
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Figure 6: Settlement Outcomes for Monetary ES Complaints
13
 (2014/15) 
 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
The compliance model is a prominent framework for the implementation of state regulation. 
Recent reforms to ES enforcement in Ontario bear its influence. The MOL has sought to reduce 
the ‘heavy hand’ of the state in claims resolution, whether through the provision of more 
information to both employers and employees, a growing emphasis on self-help and self-
regulation as the first step in claims resolution, or an emphasis on facilitated as well as non-
facilitated settlements which eschew the adjudication of legal entitlements. These developments 
are premised on a view that employees, as the desired beneficiaries of regulation, are able to 
assert their interests effectively, and that violations are relatively uncommon and result mainly 
from ignorance and incompetence of employers. At the same time, deterrence measures based on 
the notion that non-compliance is an intentional act involving an assessment of its costs and 
benefits, and which therefore imposes a punishment for violators, remain a residual feature of the 
Ontario’s ES enforcement regime. Deterrence measures are reserved mainly for employers who 
not only violate the ESA, but ignore the authority of the state when it orders compliance.  
Yet, evidence from complaints filed with the MOL paints a picture very much at odds 
with the assumptions of the compliance model. The administrative data provide several 
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indications of employees’ constrained ability to exercise voice when they believe they have 
experienced violations. The share of Ontario employees who come forward with a complaint has 
decreased in recent years, and less than 1 in 10 complainants remain on the job they are 
complaining about. Additionally, reprisal claims have increased in recent years, and a majority of 
complainants seeking an exemption to the self-help requirement indicate fear of their employer 
as the basis for their request. Complainants with claims for monetary ES violations are 
concentrated in industries and firms characterized by high rates of precarious employment, 
including accommodations and food services, support services and the construction industry as 
well as in small firms with less than 20 employees.  
Administrative data on the features of validated monetary claims indicate that intentional, 
even egregious violations are much more common than the compliance framework 
acknowledges. Unpaid wages are the most common claim filed by complainants, and the median 
amount of validated entitlements are for high dollar amounts that represent a substantial portion 
of weekly or monthly earnings for low income earners. There are further indicators of 
employers’ recalcitrance in the enforcement process. Employers are more likely to voluntarily 
comply with lower dollar value claims, and only a minority of monetary orders is fully satisfied.  
The findings point toward the need for models of enforcement that are not premised on 
the initial assumption of unintentionality of violations, and the corresponding assumption that 
enforcement should always begin with education and other compliance measures and only 
escalate when those measures have failed, as is the case in Ayres and Braithwaite’s enforcement 
pyramid. In light of changes to the organization of employment that deepen insecurity for 
employees and augment employer power, heavily reliance on compliance over deterrence is 
unlikely to effectively prevent or remedy ES violations. Effective, evidence-based workplace 
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regulation requires enforcement models that recognize workplace power imbalances, and how 
different industries organize employment in ways that create pressures and opportunities for ES 
violations.  
 
NOTES 
 
 
1
 Monetary ES violations refer to the phenomenon of employees not being paid the wages and 
other monetary benefits to which they are legally entitled.  
2 For a discussion of similar problems in the US Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division 
administrative database, as well as potential solutions, see Morantz (2014).
 
3 
There is a sharp distinction in Canada between regulatory offenses and crimes. Provinces can 
enact regulatory laws in respect of matters within their constitutional competence, which 
includes employment, and punish violators by fine and/or imprisonment. However, only the 
federal government has the constitutional authority to enact criminal laws. The difference 
between crimes and regulatory offenses is not just a matter of semantics because of the much 
greater social opprobrium that is attached to committing a crime as opposed to a regulatory 
offense.   
4 
Employers operating in this environment may also be more ignorant and incompetent than 
those operating is less highly competitive environments.  
5 
Following the budget cycle of the provincial government, the fiscal year runs from April 1 to 
March 31. 2014/15 is the most recent fiscal year for which outcome information is available for 
the majority of submitted complaints.  
 
6 
Workers can also bring civil actions to enforce ESA claims on the theory that ESA obligations 
are implied terms of the contract of employment.  Boland v. APV Canada Inc., 2005 CanLII 
3384 (ON SCDC).   
7 
Source: Complaints received from MOL (2006, 2014), non-unionized Ontario employees from 
Statistics Canada Labor Force Survey (2004-2014).
 
8 
Industry information is available for 95% of monetary ES complaints. Complaints that were 
withdrawn or settled are less likely to have industry information available than complaints with 
other outcomes. 
9 
As firm size information is only available for 60% of monetary ES complaints, this analysis 
should be interpreted with caution. Nonetheless, it corresponds with the general trends related to 
firm size identified by the MOL in their reports. 
10 
Among small and medium size businesses in Canada, only 62 percent survived for three years 
and 51 percent of firms survived for five years; survival rates are even lower among micro-
enterprises (Industry Canada 2012, 2013). 
11
 In this section, the analysis is limited to complaints that include monetary claims related to 
unpaid wages, overtime pay, vacation pay/time, public holiday pay, deductions/ temporary help 
agency (THA) fees, minimum wages, termination pay and severance pay (collectively referred to 
as monetary complaints).  
12
 A complaint can include a claim relating to one or more employment standards.
 
13 
In this graph a 2% margin around the claim amount was allowed in order to accommodate 
inconsistent rounding and decimal use in the data, which resulted in many entitlements that had a 
$1-2 difference from the claim amount.
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